Back in 2011, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled against Arizona’s immigration law (SB 1070). According to the New York Times:
PHOENIX — The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ruled against the State of Arizona on Monday and let stand a lower court decision blocking the most contentious parts of the state’s immigration law from going into effect…
Critics of the law, who have held protests and filed lawsuits to strike it down, were thrilled with the ruling.
“One of the reasons we have a judiciary is so that mobs don’t rule, so that when the Legislature oversteps its bounds there is someone to stop them,” said Omar Jadwat of the A.C.L.U. Immigrants’ Rights Project.
In its decision, the Ninth Court of Appeals agonized over the precise wording of SB 1070, scrutinizing its minutiae and the technicalities of federal law. It’s not surprising that federal law favors the federal government over state governments. And so we find statements such as these:
Even state and local officers authorized under § 1357(g) to investigate, apprehend, or detain immigrants do
not have the authority to remove immigrants; removal is exclusively the purview of the federal government.
We are not aware of any INA provision demonstrating that Congress intended to permit states to usurp the Attorney General’s role in directing state enforcement of federal immigration laws.
and more importantly:
In addition to providing the Attorney General wide discretion in the contents of each § 1357(g) agreement with a state,
Congress provided the Executive with a fair amount of discretion to determine how federal officers enforce immigration
law. The majority of § 1357 grants powers to DHS officers and employees to be exercised within the confines of the Attorney General’s regulations; this section contains few mandatory directives from Congress to the Attorney General or DHS. The Executive Associate Director for Management and Administration at U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement within DHS has explained the purpose of this Congressionally-granted discretion: “DHS exercises a large degree of discretion in determining how best to carry out its enforcement responsibilities” which “necessitates prioritization to ensure ICE expends resources most efficiently to
advance the goals of protecting national security, protecting public safety, and securing the border.”
The decision gives a lot of power to the attorney general. It assumes that his interests are the same as the interests of the American people. The court did not take into consideration the possibility that the attorney general’s interests are at odds with those of Americans. Insofar as its job is to interpret the law as it stands, it might not have been able to do so in its decision. How unfortunate.
Now that the Ninth Court of Appeals has given carte blanche to Eric Holder (and, by extension, to the office of the president) to flood the country with Mexicans and other Democrat-voters, it has the audacity to curtail our freedom of speech on the grounds that angering those migrants might be dangerous. In this decision, the court documented racial friction at the school and determined:
School officials anticipated violence or substantial disruption of or material interference with
school activities, and their response was tailored to the circumstances. As a consequence, we conclude that school
officials did not violate the students’ rights to freedom of expression, due process, or equal protection.
Once again, the court focused on technicalities and ignored the reality on the ground: That this is an invasion, an invasion largely facilitated by judges such as themselves.
When Hispanic thugs are allowed to set the tone at public schools, and when their threats of violence are rewarded, I wonder what people like Omar Jadwat would call it. I would call it “mob rule.”